Revisions for Voting

Jupiter DAO
1

DAO voting needs optimization and incentivization. LFG is a significant part of DAO voting. I will describe some of the failures I see and offer trade-offs to rectify these failures.

I want to make it clear: when I say “abstain” I mean that “abstain” is an option within voting options.

Failures

A) Voting on DAO incentives costs voters nothing, and because of this, votes are worth less. It costs no thought or real opinion to vote. This harms the future of the DAO and Jupiter.

B) Voting on LFG is seen as a pure for-profit motive. There is no reason to abstain or vote against an LFG project aside from vibes. LFG Projects do not get long-term investment, just token jeeters. JUP needs more value accrual, currently value is largely speculative for JUP.

C) Staking has no long-term benefits for stakers.

Forward Options

A) Voting on DAO initiatives needs to cost voters JUP (JUP goes to ASR fund). Choosing the “abstain” option in a DAO initiative should not cost voters any JUP and still count for ASR.

Placing a cost on DAO votes forces voters to put their money where their mind is. Allowing abstaining votes to be free shows activity but admits no real motive behind voting. The cost of voting could be pegged to a constant JUP value (0.1% of JUP stake?), but should not be too insignificant. DAO votes are important to take seriously as they determine the future of the Jupiter ecosystem.

B) Voting for LFG projects should cost JUP, which is then sent to ASR fund and winning projects (50/50). LFG projects should commit JUP to the ASR fund, if they win. Voters should be rewarded with project tokens, only if they voted for the winning project. Choosing “abstain” in voting for an LFG project should cost nothing but be counted for ASR rewards.

The way this can work is as follows:

  • Voters commit 0.1% of stake for voting. 0.05% to ASR fund and 0.05% to 2 winning projects.

  • LFG projects lock JUP into a contract while votes occur. This JUP will be sent to ASR fund if LFG project wins. The total JUP locked is visible to voters.

  • LFG projects lock a % (maybe 1-5%) of their token supply into a fund for a vesting contract. This % is visible to voters.

  • LFG projects will have their locked tokens distributed to their voters via a predetermined vesting contract (ONLY to addresses that voted for them). This vesting is visible to voters.

  • LFG projects that lose get their JUP and project tokens back.

  • LFG projects can distribute the rest of their tokens as they see fit via LFG Launchpad.

Voters will consider their votes carefully or choose to abstain (and still benefit from ASR). This also benefits LFG projects by distributing tokens to investors, less speculative. LFG launchpad will be the place for speculation and gaining further liquidity from the Jupiter community. JUP voters benefit by having projects buy the JUP token off the market and locked into ASR rewards, while also being offered early project token distribution.

C) Add staking tiers. Add minimum stake. Add minimum time staked.

Here is a template of how long-term stakers would benefit via tiers. Multiplier goes toward ASR distribution and voting power. So 100 JUP locked for 210 days counts as 101 JUP power in a vote and for ASR distribution.

Days Staked Multiplier
30 0.1 %
60 0.2 %
90 0.3 %
120 0.4 %
150 0.5 %
180 0.75 %
210 1 %

This allows smaller stake amounts to build up faster by being loyal. It also causes projects to fight for long-term thinking JUP voters. Minimum stake and minimum time staked is rather straightforward eg; “To vote in this vote, you must have 5 JUP staked for 10 days.” Or whatever limits seem fitting.

So what do you all think?

Which Forward Option is Most Important?
  • Option A
  • Option B
  • Option C
  • None of These
0 voters
8 Likes
2

Thanks for thinking this through and presenting this as proposal. I have some disagreements with all 3 points:

A) Voting on DAO incentives costs voters nothing, and because of this, votes are worth less:

  • Just because voting is free doesn’t mean it lacks thought or value. Active participants care about the DAO’s future and will vote responsibly. Imposing costs could discourage engagement. Also for majority of jup holders in low income areas around the world, it’s a huge sacrifice for them to build a reasonable bag which can be less than even 50 jup for most of them hence charging them to vote isn’t democratic at all if what they might end from it as ASR might be very little.

B) Voting on LFG is seen as a pure for profit motive:

  • Profit-driven voting isn’t inherently bad; it’s part of healthy market dynamics that’s why those incentives are there. Many projects thrive with financial backing and value accrual can follow as projects mature.

C) Staking has no long-term benefits for stakers:

  • Staking offers consistent rewards in the context of ASR for which it was created and strengthens the DAO community which is the goal it was set up for. We can’t just choose to move away from that goal cos we are thinking of staking in another contexts. It defeats the objective that it was set up for in the first place.
5 Likes
3

Well
I feel staking could be tiered per duration with some incremental benefits to longer stake times

1 Like
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If you check out Option C you will see an idea I have outlined to do this.

1 Like
5

I like option c the most.

Option A sounded great until i couldnt understand what would be the return for the voter?

If peoiple had to pay to vote and lessen ASR they wouldnt give a shit about voting imo.

However its a great idea, maybe needs some tweaks?

6 Likes
6

In Option A, the return for voting is getting your DAO initiative passed. If it isnt important for you how the DAO operates, then you should be choosing “abstain” anyway.

Plus votes are counted towards ASR.

Ill also note, these are mutually exclusive ideas. All 3 could be implemented or 1 or none.

1 Like
7

After reading the revisions, I disagree with the assumption that charging JUP to vote will necessarily improve the quality of voting. While it may discourage frivolous voting, it could also alienate smaller stakeholders who want to participate but lack sufficient JUP. This might create an imbalance in governance.
My questions are ?

  1. How will this ensure broader and fairer participation, particularly for smaller holders?

  2. Could charging JUP to vote reduce overall engagement and participation in governance?

  3. What alternative methods can improve the quality of voting without deterring smaller holders?

Is like Government charging some $ before I can make a vote :thinking:

3 Likes
8

That’s right and that’s part of the reason I am against option A in the proposal.

5 Likes
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  1. First off, adding a small cost to voting does not always mean a voter loses JUP. All votes qualify for ASR, and ASR has been more than 0.1% of stake. For holders with small amounts of stake 0.1% is very small, this extracts a higher cost out of whales and redistributes that stake to ASR (aka everyone who votes). This actually increases the wealth of little guys.

Stake Vote Tax Example:
0.001 x 5= 0.005 JUP
0.001 x 5000= 5 JUP

The little guy gets more JUP from ASR, even if he votes, since all voting taxes go into ASR. If the little guy “abstains” in a vote, then he incurs no cost and gets ASR.

Whales are also more likely to vote instead of abstain.

  1. Charging JUP does not remove participation because you still must vote to qualify for ASR. You can simply choose the “abstain” option if you do not want to pay the 0.1% vote tax.

  2. These ideas are not deterring anyone, that is your opinion. We are currently paying a price whether you recognize it or not. We get people to think about votes via incentives, not by hoping they do research.

I suggest you consider how ASR is funded in my examples and stop hyper-fixating on the idea of paying to have your opinion heard. ASR will VASTLY benefit little guys and cost whales more for voting. This distributes power more evenly than it currently is. Whales currently have a tremendous advantage in the DAO.

3 Likes
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Ill respond to your long post when I have some more time to read through it, but I mightve answered some already in my last post.

2 Likes
11

I’m happy with no costs on voting. So everyone can participate on vots. Even people with smaller bags.

But with option C i’m okay. Implement staking tiers can bring people to think about long therm.

3 Likes
12

A) Since there is no incentive to consider votes, I would say most voters are careless with their choices. Not all, but the majority.

I think I have explained already how a vote tax is beneficial so I wont go into it again, but if any of my explanation did not make sense, let me know.

B) I am not opposed to for-profit systems, but what I mean is that voters mostly view the current system as profitable no matter what. Which it is. Which means there is no incentive to really consider options. Also we need sustainable ASR funding and a way to attract LFG projects. My ideas do both.

C) I am not suggesting we move the goal of staking. My idea adds further utility to staking and benefits longer term stakers.

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Please read this further explanation above

I do think we need a new incentive structure around voting, and a way to redistribute Whale stake advantage. Otherwise no one but a few whales will matter and the DAO will be useless.

2 Likes
14

I looked further into ‘Option C’ and I think it’s a good idea.

2 Likes
15

This is where i Tiers see, maybe with a little boost for small bags. A Citty boost :smile:

1 Like
16

Great proposal! I love the idea of incentivizing DAO voting and LFG participation. By adding costs and rewards, we can ensure that votes are taken seriously and that LFG projects truly benefit the community. We could definitely make this happen!

1 Like
17

I like C the most, I do think more token utility needs to be introduced and this is a good start.
A won’t work as stakers just won’t risk their votes and we’ll find huge amounts of abstaining in the future.

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18

I would prefer this.

If people are too afraid to spend a fraction of a cent on their vote, they should choose the “abstain” option. Small stakers will pay almost nothing at 0.1% of stake. This is a cost similar to a Solana Tx. That is nothing of a price.

People with a lot of stake have to weigh the decision, “Do I want to direct the future of the DAO or not?” The fundamental question “Is it worth it?”. Right now we do not ask this of DAO participation.

And please do not forget your payment goes to ASR, so it isn’t even a true loss of funds… It is re-distributed. We are not thinking long-term and how truly fucked we are if Whales continue to compound JUP (with no spending incentives).

1 Like
19

Thanks. I think more people need to consider the utility of a DAO and whale spend incentives. Instead most are blinded by the idea of getting free money, and pretend votes matter without acknowledging whale compound problem.

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20

Option C already happens unintentionally through making 18% gain on a larger bag from ASR S1 rewards.

3 Likes