Rethinking the DAO

I am taking back an old post of mine on this forum (this) because I think that now it could be a better time to discuss the issue. In the recent times the Jupiter DAO also suffered many criticism and partial FUD due to dissatisfaction of the community about the topics submitted for voting. In good part I think it depends on the poor performance of the token, but I am convinced that this body should be redefined from its scope to its processes.

I am reading around some proposal, but in my opinion none of them is addressing the focal point: before thinking about “how” something can be done, my opinion is that it must be defined “what” has to be done. The recent proposals submitted to vote are showing clearly that there isn’t any clear task assigned to the DAO. Why a body similar to shareholders meeting should decide about a change of a logo or the hiring of a team and their salaries?
All these activities are responsibility of a management team (call it Board of Directors if you like it), not of the DAO. A DAO should have much more general tasks and should never interfere in operational matters.

Just as example, many of us remember the Meteora affair. Why has not been submitted a proposal to the DAO to fund an independent investigation about what happened? This has to do with “compliance” and “ethics” that are typical areas of jurisdiction of a DAO.

It is my personal opinion that this body should be redesigned from the foundations: its tasks must be clearly defined (i.e. jurisdiction), processes regulating the submission of proposals, functioning rules and the like.

Other topics should be also tackled and I am going to mention only some:

  1. Is it worth to introduce a minimum amount staked to have voting power? Look at data. The percentage of stakers actively voting decreases significantly with the amount staked and the two last proposals hit a low of 11-12% among those who are staking less than 100 JUP. Should voting pacts or syndicates be allowed and implemented?
  2. Should the voting power be capped at certain levels? I do not have an answer, but a linear voting power tends to favor cartels and voting control when the amounts staked are very concentrated.. I am aware of possible objections (split in different wallets and so on), but I think it is a matter worth to be thought about;
  3. Should rewards be defined in fixed amounts (new emissions or increase the circulation) or should them be linked to the profitability of the company? And how, when and to whom they should be distributed? Is the current model effective/efficient?

To conclude, this DAO is undoubtedly one of the most active, but probably is not efficient and effective enough. I think that there is space for huge improvements, but only if the matter is going to be treated in an organized way.

A big thank you to all of you who had the patience to read this text wall. Ad majora

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