Intro
As we expand with various workgroups, we will see more controversy and disagreement around approval of funding, fair valuation of services, and contestation of comparability. This is to be expected as we have members from all over the world with various experience, opportunities, economic and socioeconomic conditions. In short, “the right price” is something no one agrees on.
Proposal
- Create a Grants Budget Pool that receives a total budget of $USDC each Quarter (3-months). Decided separately in “Budget Vote”.
- Every Quarter, run a Gauge Vote for determining allocation to WG’s
- WG’s are added or removed to the Gauge Voting options via DAO proposal.
- Display the requested amount next to each WG on the voting UI
- Display if requested amount goal has been reached or not during live vote.
UI Example:
Operations:
- Each quarter WG’s can submit reports on what they have done, what they wish to further do, and the nominated amount requested.
- Voters use their voting power to distribute their preference for funding to each Work group for that quarters budget. (Multiple Choice)
- Jupiter voting power will have a ‘post-result’ ratio evaluation as to how much $USDC each vote represents. See formula below;
Formula
a = Total budget for Quarter
b = Total Votes (JUP)
c = Ratio of $USDC per JUP (Rate)
d = Votes received by WG
e = Allocated amount for Workgroup
(a / b) = c
(d * c) = e
Example with $500,000 Budget, and 30,000,000 JUP used for voting
(500,000 / 30m) = 0.0166
(d * 0.0166) = Allocated amount in $USDC
w/
1m votes out of total 30m votes = $16,660 out of $500,000 budget
15m votes out of total 30m votes = $250,000 out of $500,000 budget
Rationale
By giving voters direct influence over operational budgets each quarter, we introduce the incentive for WG’s to meet the expectations of the DAO over and on-going basis. This also gives the DAO a method of recourse if voters become dissatisfied with any of the WG’s efforts. In this way, the DAO acts like a shareholder or sponsor of the working groups, while the groups themselves can operate more independently and autonomously. This is essentially giving the option to support centralized entities ‘on top of’ decentralized authority.
By removing the criteria of on-going consensus after approving release of funds, this creates the opportunity for gaming the system with good campaigning, only to fall short or walk away from delivering. We’re all too familiar with this if we think about our governments for a moment – the issue is not the centralized compartmentalized structure, it is the centralized authority over the Treasury.
It is important to integrate quarterly epochs of funding and funding requests – not only to put a control check on potential waste, but also because of the need for flexibility with estimating and changing costs over time. What we don’t want to see, is large-sum bulk requests for annual expenses and approving these with no guarantee (or in the case of this proposal – no need for a guarantee).
With gauge voting, we’re not approach requests with a binary yes/no – we’re essentially saying “lets see what you can do with this amount over the next 3 months”. Doing this encourages WG’s to be more efficient and resourceful, whilst demonstrating their value to the community on a more regular basis. This model also accommodates additive bonus/incentive where voters may wish to grant a working group more than they requested for the quarter.
Lastly, handing further responsibility over to voters to become more directly involved in fund allocation, will strongly encourage more engagement and thoughtful consideration around creating new workgroups. As it stands currently – any group can propose any amount of funding over any duration, and that goes to a coin weighted vote. There is a strong potential for exploiting this vulnerability – and objectively that vulnerability is ourselves; humans and their opportunistic disposition. It is something that need be control, but not via trust and promise – rather by removing the opportunity and temptation. Democratizing the Treasury removes that opportunity and temptation.
In saying that, I would like to say that most people are honest, fair, and simply want to contribute their value to the best of their ability. This approach I believe will also rewards that kind of merit and demonstration much more as voters show their appreciation and ongoing support. Perhaps a better resolve than endless haggling and disagreement.
Thanks for your time, do add your feedback and thoughts. If you’re interested in how this system can further integrate into other more ambitious ideas, feel free to check out my previous post here
As long as its understandable, then those that will give it the time are more likely to give constructive feedback.