Shrimps and Crabs do not vote since their governance power is too low, what if we can balance the power of whales and normies thru length of commitment.
Introducing: Weighted Governance
A Case Study of Saber Protoco: veJUP Weighted Governance
Weighted Governance with veJUP (Hypothetical)
If $JUP uses vote-escrowed tokens (veJUP), voting power scales with lock time. Suppose:
User A locks 10,000,000 veJUP for 4 years → 4x weight = 40,000,000 votes.
User B holds 20,000,000 veJUP (30days) → 1x weight = 20,000,000 votes.
This will balance rewards with commitment for long term holders.
There have been several discussions in the past about voted weight.
My personal opinion is that this will create even bigger whales and this will not give the opportunity to new members to compete with these whales.This actions create narratives and in the end big whales that stake for a longer time decide on their own. Thats my take on that.
What i see is that there are many “bots” in the DAO and these dont vote.
We have an approx 26% addresses participation but 76% voting power participation.
that means that around 3/4 of the total voting was used. This can still improve.
Thank you for taking the time and making your first post in the forum Bella
I dont want you to be discourage by my message, other people might have a different opinion. We are all here to discuss and share our opinions
The whales been avoided are the ones that will eventually benefit more because they actually can play long term game with huge funds if its to their benefit.
Most voters might not be able lock Jup for too long.
daysRemaining: The remaining staking duration in days (up to a maximum of 4 years, or 1460 days).
1460: The maximum staking period in days (4 years), used to normalize the duration. ^ 1.5: An exponential factor (1.5) that disproportionately rewards longer staking commitments.
thank you for your feedback, my take on this is that if whales stake longer it is bullish for the price of $JUP as the circulating supply is less, meaning $JUP traders can easily push the prices up benefitting everyone in the ecosystem
Imagine circulating supply is only at 500M , with 50% buyback of $JUP the price levels will be stable and strong
I don’t like this idea, it makes things quite complicated and eventually long-dated stakers will have governance power that cannot be surmounted by newcomers (i.e., incumbents will wield more and more power). This would in turn reduce the incentive to buy and stake JUP.
